New roles for global health: diplomatic, security, and foreign policy responsiveness  by Kevany, Sebastian
Comment
www.thelancet.com/lancetgh   Vol 4   February 2016 e83
New roles for global health: diplomatic, security, and foreign 
policy responsiveness 
Global health initiatives such as the Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the US 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
have, at present, no explicit or formal internal capacity 
to respond to the overarching diplomatic or foreign 
policy concerns of either their donors or the broader 
global community.1 To the utilitarian, this respect for 
professional boundaries is to be welcomed. To the 
cosmopolitan, the increasingly connected nature of 
both the causes of, and solutions to, poverty, disease, ill 
health, and health security—in the context of associated 
considerations of world peace, non-health security, 
conﬂ ict prevention, and international stability—
implies that all entities, individuals, and policies are 
interconnected, and cannot operate in isolation of each 
other.2 As former President of the USA John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy remarked to the UN during its early idealism: 
‘‘the long labor of peace is an undertaking for every 
nation—in this eﬀ ort, none of us can remain unaligned. 
To this goal, none can be uncommitted’’.3
Most recently, the blurring of the line of institutional 
responsibilities to advance and protect global and 
international health has been shown by an expansion of 
military purviews in response to such emergencies as the 
west African Ebola outbreak.4 Correspondingly, and in 
parallel, rationales exist for global health professionals 
and organisations to work, wherever possible, to resolve 
diplomatic and foreign policy issues beyond health—
with the sine qua non that health outcomes, access to 
services, and “health for all” remain primary operational 
goals.5 Where collateral or downstream eﬀ ects—of, for 
example, health systems strengthening initiatives—can 
advance non-health international aﬀ airs to the beneﬁ t 
and satisfaction of both donor and recipient countries, 
as well as the broader global community, there seems to 
be no reason why such an expanded de jure and de facto 
remit should not be encouraged.
This has, of course, been happening since the very 
beginning of global health and international develop-
ment eﬀ orts.6 What distinguishes a 21st century 
approach—an era of increasing levels of trans-
parency, technology, education, interdigitation, and 
accountability—is the evolution of the implicit to 
the explicit; of a shift away from the covert use of aid 
to advance foreign policy and diplomacy (often in 
suboptimal ways) to an overt system of programme 
design, delivery, and evaluation that optimises both 
health and non-health goals in tandem with each 
other, in the mutual interests of both donors and 
recipients, and leveraging all available synergies. These 
considerations inevitably have implications for the 
type of interventions that are used; if in no other way 
than by ensuring that cost-eﬀ ective approaches are 
also adaptable and responsive to local needs, cultures, 
religions,7 and other country ownership considerations.8
Consider international terrorism; a growing threat to 
which conventional “hard power” responses have had 
limited success in addressing. What could, or should, 
global health do about it? Dissociate (as advocated 
by the Deans of the US medical schools),9 isolate, 
establish boundaries, and “stove-pipe”? Or accept 
the possibility that such disciplinary overlaps, and 
associated consideration of both health and non-health 
considerations in programme design, delivery, and 
location, are both benign and inevitable under “smart”,10 
multifarious, and interrelated approaches? To focus 
eﬀ orts only on health outcomes risks, as one report 
puts it, creating “tense and confusing dualities”11 when 
measured against political, diplomatic, or other foreign 
policy metrics and benchmarks. It could therefore be 
both appropriate and timely for global health leaders to 
take the initiative in establishing mutually acceptable 
parameters for such interdisciplinary engagements 
before it is too late, and the chance for such inputs has 
passed.
Two recent pieces—one developing an instrument 
for the establishment and evaluation of diplomatic and 
foreign policy principles and standards within global 
health programmes,7 the other proposing a set of codes 
or soft laws by which global health governance can 
control and calibrate its inputs to international security 
and the broader, non-health interests of the global 
community12—might help to provide the basis for such 
an approach. For so long reliant on resource allocation 
instruments such as  cost-eﬀ ectiveness, making narrow 
metrics the only consideration in assessing programmatic 
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worth or value,13 policy makers now have the option of 
expanded, holistic assessments of the eﬀ ects of global 
health programmes across both health and non-health 
outcomes.
To return to the original example, for how long 
can the Global Fund—an organisation with growing 
international inﬂ uence—attempt to transcend the non-
health political, security, and international relation 
concerns of the global community, which will continue 
to be implicitly aﬀ ected by its interventions? Is the 
illusory virtue of apolitical aid—the very existence of 
which is highly questionable—worth the cost of avoiding 
(often minor) modiﬁ cations to programme design and 
delivery that enable the harmonised achievement of 
benign health and non-health objectives?
 With the ascendancy of the global health diplomacy 
paradigm,1 both bilateral and multilateral donors now 
have a powerful and unique opportunity to pursue and 
support noble humanitarian and international relations 
goals that are closely linked to the high ideals of global 
health. The development of diplomatic, political, 
and security, and foreign policy liaison oﬃ  ces—in the 
manner of the US Oﬃ  ce of Global Health Diplomacy—
would help to ensure that criteria for positive diplomatic 
and foreign policy eﬀ ects are advanced in tandem with 
world health.
By elaborating and making explicit to donors the 
benign collateral eﬀ ects of health programmes, 
global health diplomacy approaches also present an 
important message to funders: that their investments, 
as well as pursuing altruistic ideals, also achieve 
even more “enlightened self-interest”10 ends such 
as national security, international relations, conﬂ ict 
resolution, world peace, and the prevention or 
mitigation of armed conﬂ ict—through, for example, 
improved communications or the establishment of an 
international presence.14 At a time when arguments 
against the augmentation of hard power budgets have 
become increasingly compelling, if the same aims can be 
achieved through soft or smart power,15 we stand on the 
brink of an era in which global health will become ﬁ rmly 
established in the high political pantheon.
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